Sophie Olúwolé mounts a rigorous defence of Yorùbá philosophy against common Western academic objections that dismiss African thought as merely religious, mystical or non-systematic. She challenges the notion that philosophy must follow Western forms to be valid, arguing that Yorùbá thought meets all criteria for philosophical rigour when properly understood through its own conceptual frameworks.

Olúwolé identifies several common misconceptions about African philosophy: that it's expressed only through emotion rather than reason (pg 84), that oral traditions preclude critical analysis (pg 85), that it relies too heavily on myths and proverbs (pg 85), and that it's overly preoccupied with spiritual beings (pg 89). She systematically dismantles each claim through detailed textual analysis of Odù Ifá, the Yorùbá philosophical corpus, showing how these criticisms stem from Eurocentric biases rather than substantive engagement with the texts.

Central to her defence is the institution of the Babaláwo, the custodians of Yorùbá wisdom: "All prominent scholars of Ifá now testify that the corpus is a computerized storage of Yorùbá thought... Many Ifá texts are treatises on science, religion, philosophy, mathematics, law, politics, education, poetry, sociology, etc." (pg 23). She demonstrates how the Babaláwo undergo rigorous training to memorise and interpret over 400,000 verses across 2,000 chapters - a systematic tradition comparable to Western philosophical canons in its complexity and depth.

Olúwolé particularly objects to methodologies that judge Yorùbá philosophy through interviews with contemporary thinkers (pg 95) or Western travellers' accounts (pg 85) rather than engaging directly with classical texts. She provides direct translations from Odù Ifá to show its logical structure, mathematical foundations (pg 92), and capacity for criticism and development (pg 151). Her analysis reveals sophisticated systems of binary notation (pg 92) and structured theorising (pg 98, 106) that meet Western standards of philosophical rigour while maintaining distinctively Yorùbá characteristics.

A crucial aspect of her defence involves rehabilitating Yorùbá divination (Ifá) as a legitimate philosophical method rather than mere superstition. She explains that Ifá represents "a computerized compendium of the [Yorùbá] people's views on different aspects of nature and human existence" (pg 14), using mathematical probability (pg 48) as a systematic method for approximating truth within human cognitive limits. This epistemological approach acknowledges that absolute truth belongs only to the divine (Olódùmarè), while developing rigorous methods for human understanding.

Olúwolé also counters the argument that oral transmission invalidates Yorùbá philosophy by noting that Socrates similarly left no written works, yet his philosophical status remains unquestioned (pg 36, 53). The medium of transmission matters less than the systematic nature of the thought itself. She demonstrates how Ifá verses employ logical structures comparable to Hegelian dialectic, with patterns of thesis, antithesis and synthesis that show philosophical development through criticism (pg 151).

Her defence extends to addressing mistranslations that make Yorùbá philosophy appear irrational (pg 98), providing more philosophically rigorous translations that reveal its systematic nature. She shows how proverbs function as "conceptual tool[s] of analysis" (pg 74) rather than mere folk wisdom, with sayings like "Explanation is the gem of proposition, without it, there cannot be any understanding" demonstrating the tradition's commitment to rational discourse.

Olúwolé develops a rigorous methodology for comparing philosophical traditions that avoids common pitfalls of Eurocentric bias. She defines comparative philosophy as "comparisons of ideas, concepts, principles and theories in philosophy and comparison as the study of the works of two or more thinkers or systems" (pg 10). Her approach recognises both universal features of philosophy and culturally specific expressions, creating a balanced framework for cross-cultural analysis.

She outlines an eight-point methodological framework for proper comparison: "1. ascertain similarities and make them explicit; 2. identify differences... to describe and explain them; 3. dispel prejudices; 4. avoid mystification and exoticism; 5. assume the existence of Universal logical laws, 6. compare equalities to avert categorical mistakes, 7. avoid generalizations 8. do not mistake parts of a tradition for the whole" (pg 154). This comprehensive approach guards against both false equivalence and exotic othering while maintaining philosophical rigour.

A key innovation is her treatment of oral and written traditions as equally valid philosophical media. She notes that Socrates, like Örünmilà, left no written works, yet no one questions Socrates' status as a philosopher (pg 36, 53). The systematic nature of thought matters more than its medium of transmission. This challenges the oral-literate divide often used to marginalise African thought and establishes methodological parity between traditions with different transmission histories.

Olúwolé also addresses the artificial separation of philosophy from other disciplines in Yorùbá thought: "like in most ancient traditions of the world, there were no hard lines drawn between Religion, Philosophy, Science and Social Studies" (pg 48). She argues that modern disciplinary boundaries shouldn't be anachronistically imposed on classical systems of thought, advocating instead for understanding each tradition within its own epistemological framework.

Her methodology pays particular attention to conceptual translation issues, noting how mistranslations of Yorùbá terms have contributed to misunderstandings of its philosophical sophistication (pg 98). She provides examples of more accurate translations that reveal the logical structure of Ifá verses, demonstrating how linguistic precision is crucial for fair comparison. This extends to recognising culturally specific forms of argumentation, such as the Yorùbá use of proverbs as "conceptual tool[s] of analysis" (pg 74) rather than mere folk wisdom.

The comparative framework is applied systematically in her analysis of Socrates and Örünmilà, where she identifies both convergences (their shared epistemological humility - pg 56) and divergences (their contrasting views on gender equality - pg 79). This balanced approach models how to acknowledge similarities while respecting fundamental differences in metaphysical foundations.

Olúwolé's methodology also addresses the historical power dynamics affecting philosophical recognition, critiquing reliance on "Western travellers, seekers of wealth and exoticism, indoctrinated missioners and socially biased political agents" (pg 85) as sources about African thought. She insists on consulting primary texts (like Odù Ifá) and trained custodians (like the Babaláwo) to avoid distorted representations.

Ultimately, her comparative framework aims for what she calls "dialogues rather than as speculative and ideological debates" (pg 177), creating space for mutual learning between traditions while maintaining rigorous standards of philosophical analysis. This approach respects cultural specificity without sacrificing critical engagement, offering a model for truly global philosophical discourse.

Olúwolé rehabilitates Yorùbá divination (Ifá) as a legitimate philosophical method, demonstrating its systematic nature beyond superficial religious appearances. She explains that Örünmilà's approach uses "mathematical laws of probability" (pg 48) in divination to access truth, recognising that humans cannot possess absolute knowledge but can develop rigorous methods for approximating it within cognitive limits.

The Ifá system operates on several sophisticated philosophical principles: that ultimate truth belongs only to the divine (Olódùmarè), that humans must use systematic methods to approximate truth, and that all human knowledge is necessarily partial. This epistemological humility contrasts with some Western claims to certain knowledge. Olúwolé shows how Ifá verses follow logical structures comparable to Hegelian dialectic and allow for critical debate (pg 74), using proverbs as "conceptual tool[s] of analysis" when discourse becomes unclear.

Key to understanding Ifá as philosophy is recognising its binary notation system (pg 92) and structured theorising (pg 98, 106). The system isn't arbitrary but follows mathematical and logical patterns that can be analysed philosophically. Olúwolé provides detailed examples of Ifá verses showing this systematic structure (pg 99, 104-109), demonstrating how divination serves as a methodological tool for philosophical inquiry rather than mere superstition.

Olúwolé also addresses common mistranslations that make Ifá appear irrational (pg 98), providing more philosophically rigorous translations that reveal its systematic nature. She contrasts Örünmilà's method with Socratic dialogue, showing how both employ questioning to arrive at truth: "I want to find out if any of my colleagues who believe they know the beginning and end of matters can make good this claim... I myself do not know these things." (pg 56). Both philosophers acknowledge the limits of human knowledge while developing rigorous methods to pursue truth within those limits.

A distinctive feature of Örünmilà's method is its treatment of uncertainty as a fundamental condition of human knowing. Where Western philosophy often seeks certainty, Ifá begins from the premise that absolute truth is divine and develops probabilistic methods for practical decision-making. This produces what we might call an epistemology of uncertainty, valuing practical wisdom over abstract certainty while maintaining systematic rigour.

The mathematical foundations of Ifá divination are particularly noteworthy, with its binary notation system (pg 92) anticipating modern computing principles. Olúwolé explains how the Babaláwo's training involves memorising complex configurations that function as a "computerized storage of Yorùbá thought" (pg 23), demonstrating that oral traditions can maintain sophisticated logical structures without written texts.

Olúwolé also highlights how Örünmilà's method accommodates philosophical development over time, with evidence that Odù Ifá has "accepted criticism and development" (pg 151). This challenges stereotypes of African thought as static or uncritical, showing instead a living tradition that evolves through reasoned debate while maintaining core principles.

The practical application of this method appears in Örünmilà's egalitarian conclusions about gender and social equality (pg 79), showing how his epistemological approach leads to distinctive ethical positions. Unlike Socrates' acceptance of Greek gender biases, Örünmilà argues that "experienced men, experienced women, experienced youth, and experienced foreigners, have equal political rights" - a position Olúwolé connects to his complementary dualist metaphysics.

Ultimately, Olúwolé presents Örünmilà's method as a sophisticated alternative to Western philosophical approaches, one that begins from human limitations rather than aspiring to divine certainty. This makes it particularly relevant for contemporary epistemological debates about uncertainty, probability, and the limits of human knowledge.

Olúwolé identifies complementary dualism as the defining feature of Yorùbá metaphysics, contrasting it sharply with Western oppositional dualism. She defines dualism broadly as "the theory that reality is made up of two features namely mind and matter" (pg 127), but distinguishes between complementary and oppositional varieties as fundamentally different ways of understanding reality's basic structure.

Oppositional dualism, characteristic of Western thought since Descartes, holds that "matter and idea are oppositional in nature, and that there are no recognizable intermediate possibilities between them" (pg 136). This creates binary either/or categories that cannot be reconciled - a framework Olúwolé argues is foreign to Yorùbá thought and responsible for many Western philosophical impasses.

Complementary dualism, by contrast, sees mind and matter as "inseparable and complementary in nature and function" (pg 139). Örünmilà's philosophy exemplifies this view, observing in nature the constant pairing and interdependence of opposites. A Yorùbá proverb captures this: "When reason is stretched to the limit, folly becomes inevitable" (pg 140), showing how opposites contain and necessitate each other in a dynamic relationship.

Olúwolé traces this framework through Yorùbá ontology, where being consists of inseparable pairs like physical/spiritual, individual/community. She connects it to Ubuntu philosophy through Ramose's analysis: "Ubu- as the generalized understanding of be-ing may be said to be distinctly ontological, whereas -ntu as the nodal point at which being assumes concrete form or a mode of be-ing" (pg 142). These aren't separate but form a "continuous whole-ness" (pg 142), reflecting complementary dualism's relational ontology.

The ethical and political consequences of this metaphysical difference are profound. Olúwolé argues that oppositional dualism "ignores the facts of human experience" (pg 160-1) and struggles to establish inalienable rights because it views individuals as fundamentally separate. By contrast, complementary dualism's recognition of interdependence naturally leads to Ubuntu principles: "to be a human being is to affirm one's humanity by recognizing the humanity of others" (pg 161). This makes human dignity inherent to relational existence.

Olúwolé demonstrates how oppositional dualism historically supported exclusionary practices, citing Aristotle's belief that "full excellence can be realized only by matured male of the upper class" (pg 163) and Plato's gratitude for being "born Greek, and not barbarian; free man and not slave, man and not woman" (pg 163). These exclusionary tendencies persisted through Enlightenment philosophy into modernity, rooted in oppositional metaphysics that privileges separation over relation.

Complementary dualism offers an alternative foundation for human rights that Olúwolé argues is more philosophically robust: "The raging argument, that Fundamental Human Rights are neither scientifically nor rationally inalienable, is intellectually valid only within Western Binary Oppositional Conceptual Frameworks but invalid within the Binary Complementarity Framework" (pg 185). This has direct implications for contemporary debates about universal rights and intercultural ethics.

The framework also affects social and political philosophy. Where oppositional dualism supports individualism, complementary dualism understands persons as nodes in relational networks. This explains Örünmilà's egalitarianism (pg 79) - if being is fundamentally relational, excluding others undermines one's own existence. Human rights thus become ontological necessities rather than ethical add-ons in this framework.

Olúwolé connects complementary dualism to observable reality: "how things are in real life" (pg 160-1). The complementarity observed in nature (day/night, male/female, life/death) mirrors human relationality. This grounding in experience makes Yorùbá ontology empirically verifiable in ways some Western metaphysical systems are not, offering potential resolutions to longstanding philosophical problems about the relationship between mind and matter.

Ultimately, Olúwolé presents complementary dualism not just as an African metaphysical framework but as a valuable contribution to global philosophy: "Development based on the African world view of Binary Complementarity is what most scholars now see as the solution to the various forms of intellectual and social upheavals across the world" (pg 175). Its relational approach offers alternatives to the binaries and oppositions plaguing Western thought since Descartes.

Olúwolé's comparative analysis reveals striking parallels between Socrates and Örünmilà as foundational figures in their respective traditions, while carefully delineating their crucial philosophical differences. Both exhibit profound epistemological humility, with Socrates stating: "For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant of how these things are" (pg 56) and Örünmilà similarly admitting: "I myself do not know these things" (pg 56). This shared scepticism about absolute human knowledge establishes common ground between Greek and Yorùbá philosophical traditions.

Their ethical philosophies show remarkable convergence in valuing education, social development, and virtuous living. Both emphasise the cultivation of excellence - arête in Greek, Iwà in Yorùbá - as the path to eudaimonia or human flourishing (pg 74, 76). Olúwolé notes their shared belief that "education is the most effective instrument for the development of the individual and society" (pg 76), demonstrating how both traditions connect personal virtue with social wellbeing.

The philosophers' methodological approaches reveal both similarities and culturally specific differences. Both employ questioning techniques to arrive at truth, with Örünmilà's divinatory method and Socratic dialogue serving as distinct but equally systematic approaches to philosophical inquiry. However, where Socratic questioning seeks to expose contradictions in interlocutors' beliefs, Örünmilà's method acknowledges the probabilistic nature of human knowledge through its mathematical foundations (pg 48).

Significant divergences emerge in their metaphysical commitments and social philosophies. Where Socrates maintains a Platonic dualism separating ideal forms from material reality, Örünmilà's complementary dualism sees matter and idea as "an inseparable pair" (pg 78). This fundamental difference informs their contrasting views on equality, with Socrates accepting Greek gender biases while Örünmilà argues that "experienced men, experienced women, experienced youth, and experienced foreigners, have equal political rights to run the affairs of state" (pg 79).

Their epistemological differences prove particularly revealing. Socrates believed philosophers could glimpse divine ideals (pg 77), while Örünmilà held that absolute truth belongs solely to Olódùmarè (God), with humans limited to relative truth through "sense experience, discussion and critical analysis" (pg 78). This distinction reflects their broader cultural contexts - Greek confidence in human reason versus Yorùbá recognition of human cognitive limits.

Olúwolé carefully analyses their respective conceptions of truth. For Socrates, truth is eternal and unchanging (pg 55), aligning with his theory of forms. Örünmilà similarly acknowledges an eternal divine truth ("Truth is what the Great Invisible God uses in organizing the world" - pg 55), but emphasises the provisional nature of human truth-seeking. This creates different philosophical orientations - one aspiring to absolute knowledge, the other working within human limitations.

The philosophers' views on death and destiny reveal further cultural specificities. Socrates' famous equanimity facing death contrasts with Yorùbá philosophy's more nuanced understanding of destiny (ayanmo), which balances predetermined elements with individual agency. Olúwolé shows how these differences stem from their metaphysical frameworks - oppositional versus complementary conceptions of reality.

Political philosophy emerges as another area of significant divergence. While both address statecraft, Örünmilà's inclusive vision contrasts sharply with Socrates' elitism in Plato's Republic. Olúwolé attributes this to their differing ontological commitments - Örünmilà's complementary dualism naturally leads to more egalitarian conclusions than Socrates' hierarchical oppositional framework.

Ultimately, Olúwolé presents these two philosophers as representing equally valid but fundamentally different approaches to philosophical inquiry, each rooted in their cultural context. Their comparison serves not to establish superiority but to demonstrate philosophy's diverse expressions across human cultures, challenging Eurocentric narratives of philosophical development.

Olúwolé adopts and expands Maurier's definition of conceptual frameworks as themes that "give thought its internal consistency, its wholeness, its originality, in such a way that to understand a thought is to grasp hold of it by that unspoken principle which unifies and illuminates it" (pg 118). These frameworks represent the foundational, often implicit assumptions that shape how philosophers across traditions understand and interpret reality.

She identifies four primary conceptual frameworks in global philosophy: materialist monism (prioritising matter), idealist monism (prioritising mind), oppositional dualism (separating mind and matter), and complementary dualism (integrating them). The first three dominate Western philosophical history from pre-Socratic materialism through Cartesian dualism, while complementary dualism characterises Yorùbá and other African philosophies as a distinct but equally valid approach.

These frameworks develop from basic intuitions about reality - what Yorùbá call "inner eyes" (Ojú Inú) (pg 121). Olúwolé emphasises how they're shaped by historical and cultural experiences, with African frameworks reflecting "pre-colonial, slavery, colonial and post-colonial eras" (pg 121). Her focus on classical Yorùbá philosophy examines frameworks predating colonial disruptions, revealing sophisticated indigenous systems of thought.

The significance of identifying these frameworks lies in understanding how they shape entire philosophical systems: "The main issue in the debate about the existence of African philosophy is to identify and define the conceptual framework(s) within which African ideas, beliefs, principles and theories all hang together as a rational and scientific system of thought" (pg 122). Recognising complementary dualism as a valid framework thus legitimises Yorùbá philosophy as systematic thought rather than mysticism.

Olúwolé demonstrates how these frameworks operate at both macro and micro levels. At the macro level, they determine broad orientations toward reality - whether matter and mind are separate or integrated. At the micro level, they shape specific philosophical positions on ethics, politics, and epistemology. For instance, oppositional frameworks tend toward either/or categorisations, while complementary frameworks embrace both/and reasoning.

The historical development of these frameworks reveals important cultural differences. Western philosophy's movement from monism through dualism reflects particular intellectual trajectories, while Yorùbá philosophy maintained complementary dualism throughout its classical period. This challenges evolutionary models of philosophical development that position Western thought as most advanced.

Olúwolé particularly critiques the universalisation of oppositional frameworks as the only valid philosophical approach: "the view that matter and idea are oppositional in nature... is one of the most central canons of rationality in the Western tradition of philosophy" (pg 136). She shows how this presumption has led to the exclusion of complementary frameworks from serious philosophical consideration.

The practical consequences of these frameworks are profound. Oppositional dualism's either/or structure informs Western legal systems (guilty/innocent binaries), gender constructs (male/female opposition), and even international relations (friend/enemy distinctions). Complementary dualism, by contrast, informs Yorùbá approaches to conflict resolution (emphasising reconciliation), gender (recognising fluidity), and social organisation (valuing interdependence).

Olúwolé's framework analysis ultimately serves to provincialise Western philosophical assumptions while creating space for alternative conceptual systems. By demonstrating complementary dualism's internal coherence and explanatory power, she challenges philosophy's Eurocentric boundaries and advocates for a truly global philosophical discourse that recognises multiple valid approaches to fundamental questions.

Olúwolé makes the provocative argument that complementary dualism offers stronger philosophical foundations for human rights than Western oppositional frameworks, which she contends "ignore the facts of human experience" (pg 160-1) and struggle to establish inalienable rights because they view individuals as fundamentally separate entities. This metaphysical difference has profound ethical and political consequences.

She meticulously documents Western philosophy's historical failures on human dignity, noting Aristotle's explicit exclusion of women, children, non-Greeks and workers from full humanity: "full excellence can be realized only by matured male of the upper class" (pg 163). Even Plato, often celebrated for his relative progressivism, expressed gratitude for being "born Greek, and not barbarian; free man and not slave, man and not woman" (pg 163), revealing deep-seated exclusionary tendencies.

These exclusionary patterns persisted through Enlightenment philosophy into modernity, with Olúwolé observing: "Most political philosophers of the Enlightenment Age, rather than take sides with Plato, pitched their tent with Aristotle by defending and propagating male chauvinism as the ideal principle and practice of democracy. This ideology dominated Western socio-political thought for the next two thousand years, right down to the 21st century" (pg 163). She traces this continuity to oppositional dualism's either/or structure.

By contrast, complementary dualism's recognition of interdependence naturally leads to Ubuntu principles: "to be a human being is to affirm one's humanity by recognizing the humanity of others, and on that basis, establish humane relationship with them" (pg 161). This framework makes human dignity inherent to relational existence rather than requiring abstract justification through concepts like natural rights.

Olúwolé develops a sophisticated critique of Western human rights discourse, arguing that "there is no inherent base in terms of which Fundamental Human Rights can be demonstrated as rational, scientific and, consequently intellectually inalienable" (pg 152) within oppositional frameworks. The abstract individualism characteristic of Lockean rights theories struggles to establish why rights should be universal rather than contingent.

Complementary dualism resolves this by grounding rights in the very nature of being: "The raging argument, that Fundamental Human Rights are neither scientifically nor rationally inalienable, is intellectually valid only within Western Binary Oppositional Conceptual Frameworks but invalid within the Binary Complementarity Framework" (pg 185). Rights become ontological necessities rather than ethical aspirations in this view.

Olúwolé extends this analysis to contemporary debates about universalism versus cultural relativism in human rights. Complementary dualism offers a middle path - recognising universal human dignity while accommodating cultural specificity in how dignity is expressed and protected. This addresses postcolonial critiques of human rights as Western impositions while maintaining their universal validity.

The practical implications appear in Örünmilà's egalitarian social philosophy, which grants "equal political rights" to all regardless of gender, age or origin (pg 79). Unlike the exclusionary tendencies of Greek philosophy, this inclusive vision flows naturally from complementary dualism's relational ontology, demonstrating how metaphysical commitments shape concrete political arrangements.

Olúwolé ultimately presents complementary dualism as not just an African metaphysical alternative but as a crucial corrective to Western philosophy's limitations in addressing contemporary human rights challenges. Its relational approach provides more robust foundations for universal dignity in an increasingly interconnected world.

Olúwolé develops a distinctive African humanism grounded in complementary dualism's metaphysical foundations, offering a radical alternative to Western humanist traditions. She critiques Western humanisms like Kant's "Universal Moral Obligation" or Herrick's empathy-based morality as insufficiently rooted in experiential reality (pg 181-2), arguing they rely on abstract principles rather than observable features of existence.

This African humanism differs fundamentally from Western versions by being "not based on sympathy and/or emotion... but one demonstrable as a scientifically and rationally justified intellectual thesis" (pg 183). It derives from the ontological complementarity of existence rather than from natural law or social contract theories. Where Western humanism often struggles to bridge the is-ought gap, Yorùbá humanism flows directly from descriptions of how existence works.

The practical consequences appear throughout Yorùbá social and political philosophy. Örünmilà's egalitarianism - granting equal political rights to men, women, youth and foreigners (pg 79) - follows logically from complementary dualism's relational ontology. This contrasts sharply with Greek and Enlightenment exclusions based on oppositional categories (civilised/barbarian, man/woman, free/slave), demonstrating how metaphysical frameworks inform concrete social arrangements.

Olúwolé connects this humanism to Ubuntu philosophy through Ramose's analysis of being as both generalised (Ubu-) and particularised (-ntu), forming a "continuous whole-ness" (pg 142). This ontological framework makes humane treatment of others an existential imperative rather than merely an ethical choice - to deny another's humanity is to undermine one's own being.

She contrasts this with Western individualism's struggles to establish moral obligations to others, particularly across cultural or national boundaries. Where Kantian ethics relies on abstract universalisation, Yorùbá humanism emerges from the concrete reality of human interdependence observable in daily life: "how things are in real life" (pg 160-1). This grounding in experience makes its moral claims more philosophically robust, in Olúwolé's view.

The political implications are significant. Olúwolé argues that "Development based on the African world view of Binary Complementarity is what most scholars now see as the solution to the various forms of intellectual and social upheavals across the world" (pg 175). This humanist framework offers alternatives to both neoliberal individualism and collectivist authoritarianism by recognising individuals as fundamentally relational rather than either isolated or subsumed.

Olúwolé extends this analysis to contemporary African philosophy's engagement with modernity. Rather than rejecting Western humanism entirely, she reconstructs it on complementary dualist foundations, creating space for African contributions to global philosophical discourse. This moves beyond simple nativism or uncritical adoption of Western frameworks.

Key to this humanism is its treatment of difference. Where oppositional frameworks often view difference as threatening (leading to exclusion or assimilation), complementary frameworks see difference as enriching - different "modes of be-ing" (pg 142) that together constitute the whole. This informs Yorùbá philosophy's historical tolerance for diversity compared to Western exclusivism.

Olúwolé ultimately presents African humanism as both culturally specific and universally relevant. Its Yorùbá foundations make it distinctly African, while its relational ontology addresses universal human concerns about how to live together. This exemplifies her vision for African philosophy's contribution to global thought: "International social harmony is realizable through serious comparative studies of human traditions of thought" (pg 177).

Olúwolé offers a philosophically rigorous critique of Négritude and similar cultural nationalist movements, arguing they inadvertently perpetuate colonial epistemologies by accepting racist stereotypes about African irrationality: "Now that Racism has been demonstrated as a pseudo-science, Négritude, a theory based on its auspices, must suffer the same fate" (pg 90). Her critique focuses not on the political aims of these movements but on their problematic philosophical foundations.

She identifies the central paradox of Négritude - while attempting to reclaim African identity, it uncritically adopts European racial categories and valuations, merely reversing the value polarity: "the proposal of the existence of a biological African Personality that defines a unique African Conscience as a cultural mode of thought" (pg 180) accepts the premise that Africans are essentially different in their cognitive processes. This, Olúwolé argues, reinforces rather than challenges colonial knowledge systems.

Olúwolé's critique extends to the methodological weaknesses of Négritude's approach. By celebrating emotion and intuition over systematic thought, it validates colonial stereotypes that "Africans traditionally express their ideas, beliefs and views in emotive, non-rational and unscientific terms" (pg 84). This creates what she sees as a false dichotomy between Western rationality and African emotionality that serves neither African development nor accurate self-understanding.

The philosophical roots of this critique lie in Olúwolé's demonstration of classical Yorùbá philosophy's systematic nature. Against Négritude's romanticised Africa, she presents Odù Ifá as evidence that "the claim that Africans are religious people who are oblivious of the crucial role science and technology plays in the development of the human society, is not factually true of all ancient African societies" (pg 177). The Babaláwo's rigorous training (pg 23) and Ifá's mathematical structures (pg 92) contradict notions of inherent African irrationality.

Olúwolé particularly objects to what she sees as Négritude's historical amnesia about Africa's intellectual traditions: "beliefs that claim only white people possess the natural ability to think in scientific, rational and critical terms are racist" (pg 90). By ignoring classical African philosophy's systematic aspects, Négritude cuts Africans off from their own intellectual heritage while ironically validating colonial pseudoscience about racial cognitive differences.

Her alternative vision builds African identity on demonstrable philosophical traditions like complementary dualism rather than romanticised notions of African essence. This allows Africans to claim both cultural specificity and universal rationality: "Philosophies from two different cultures of the world must share some universal features to pass muster as 'critical' philosophy. They must, however, differ in some substantial way to be classified as two cultural traditions of philosophy" (pg 150). This balanced approach avoids both uncritical Westernisation and reactive nativism.

The political implications of this critique are significant. Olúwolé suggests that by basing African identity on non-rational characteristics, Négritude undermines African claims to equal participation in global intellectual discourse. Her approach instead asserts Africa's philosophical parity while maintaining cultural distinctiveness - a crucial stance in postcolonial contexts where claims to rationality remain politically charged.

Olúwolé connects this critique to broader issues in postcolonial thought, noting how "Western educated scholars" (pg 181) often approach African philosophy with preconceived frameworks that prevent genuine understanding. She advocates instead for engagement with classical texts like Odù Ifá on their own terms, using methodologies that recognise their systematic nature rather than exoticising them as "folk philosophy."

Ultimately, Olúwolé's critique seeks not to dismiss Négritude's political importance but to challenge its philosophical foundations and point toward more robust bases for African identity. By rooting African self-understanding in demonstrable intellectual traditions rather than reactive oppositions, she aims to move beyond what she sees as the dead ends of both colonial epistemology and some anti-colonial responses.

Olúwolé performs crucial philosophical work in rehabilitating Yorùbá divination (Ifá) as a systematic method for pursuing truth rather than dismissing it as superstition. She explains that Ifá represents "a computerized compendium of the [Yorùbá] people's views on different aspects of nature and human existence" (pg 14), making it philosophy rather than religion when properly understood through its own epistemological frameworks.

The Ifá system operates on sophisticated philosophical principles that challenge Western assumptions about divination. At its core is the recognition that "predictions are arrived at through the use of mathematical laws of probability" (pg 48), establishing it as a form of probabilistic reasoning rather than mystical fortune-telling. This mathematical foundation, particularly its binary notation system (pg 92), demonstrates Ifá's systematic nature and anticipates modern computing principles.

Olúwolé reveals Ifá's complex structure and methodology: the memorisation of over 400,000 verses across 2,000 chapters by Babaláwo (pg 23), intricate classification schemes, and capacity for logical argumentation. Verses follow patterns comparable to Hegelian dialectic, showing philosophical development through criticism and refinement (pg 151). This systematic nature qualifies it as philosophy despite its unfamiliar form to Western academics.

Key to understanding Ifá philosophically is its treatment of uncertainty as a fundamental condition of human knowing. Where Western philosophy often seeks absolute certainty, Ifá begins from human cognitive limitations - only Olódùmarè (God) possesses absolute truth, while humans must content themselves with probabilistic approximations. This produces what might be called an epistemology of uncertainty, valuing practical wisdom within cognitive constraints.

Olúwolé carefully distinguishes Ifá from simplistic notions of divination. The Babaláwo's role resembles that of a philosophical consultant more than a religious priest: "An essential part of the training of the Babaláwo... is the commitment to memory a substantial number of the over four hundred thousand verses in the over two thousand chapters of Ifá oral corpus" (pg 23). This extensive training produces not mystics but what she terms "traditional Yorùbá philosophers."

The system's mathematical sophistication is particularly noteworthy. Ifá uses binary notation (pg 92) to classify knowledge systematically, with configurations that can be analysed combinatorially. Olúwolé shows how this structure allows for complex logical operations and pattern recognition that meet Western standards of rational discourse while maintaining distinctively Yorùbá characteristics.

Ifá's approach to truth-seeking offers an alternative to Western philosophical methods. Rather than the Socratic pursuit of definitions or Cartesian search for indubitable foundations, Ifá employs what might be called "practical probabilism" - methods for making the best possible decisions given inevitable uncertainty. This resonates with contemporary approaches like Bayesian reasoning while emerging from indigenous African thought.

Olúwolé also highlights Ifá's capacity for self-correction and development: "Odù Ifá has accepted criticism and development" (pg 151). Unlike static dogmas, Ifá verses show evidence of philosophical evolution through reasoned debate, challenging stereotypes of African thought as unchanging or uncritical. This dynamic quality mirrors the progressive nature of Western philosophical traditions.

Ultimately, Olúwolé presents Ifá divination as both culturally specific and philosophically universal - a distinctively Yorùbá approach to questions about knowledge, certainty and decision-making that nevertheless contributes to global philosophical discourse. Its rehabilitation challenges Eurocentric definitions of philosophy while expanding the discipline's methodological horizons.

Olúwolé develops a robust Yorùbá ontology (theory of being) based on complementary dualism's relational framework, offering a comprehensive alternative to Western individualist conceptions of existence. Drawing on Ramose's analysis of Ubuntu, she shows how being is both generalised (Ubu-) and particularised (-ntu), forming a "continuous whole-ness" (pg 142) that overcomes Western dichotomies between universal and particular.

In Yorùbá thought, existence is inherently dual yet unified - what Western philosophy might call a "coincidence of opposites." Örünmilà's view that reality consists of "two inseparable elements" (pg 55) extends beyond mind-matter dualism to encompass all aspects of being. Entities exist through their relationships rather than in isolation, creating an ontology of radical interdependence.

This contrasts sharply with Cartesian dualism's radical separation of mind and body, which struggles to explain their interaction. Complementary dualism resolves this classic philosophical problem by understanding apparent opposites as mutually constitutive rather than fundamentally separate. Day implies night, life implies death, individual implies community - these pairings aren't oppositions but complements.

The practical consequences appear in social ontology. Where Western individualism posits discrete selves, Yorùbá ontology understands persons as nodes in relational networks. This explains Örünmilà's egalitarianism (pg 79) - if being is fundamentally relational, excluding others undermines one's own existence. Human rights thus become ontological necessities rather than ethical add-ons in this framework.

Olúwolé connects this ontology to observable reality: "how things are in real life" (pg 160-1). The complementarity observed in nature (day/night, male/female, life/death) mirrors human relationality. This grounding in experience makes Yorùbá ontology empirically verifiable in ways some Western metaphysical systems are not, addressing longstanding philosophical problems about the relationship between experience and reality.

The ontology extends to understanding personhood as fundamentally relational. A person isn't an isolated Cartesian ego but exists through networks of relationships - to family, community, ancestors, and the natural world. This challenges Western individualism while avoiding collectivist dissolution of the individual. Personhood becomes a dynamic process rather than a static substance.

Olúwolé shows how this ontology informs Yorùbá epistemology. Knowing isn't an individual act but a communal process, reflected in Ifá divination's consultative nature. Truth emerges through dialogue and consensus rather than individual revelation, contrasting with both rationalist and empiricist models of knowledge acquisition in Western philosophy.

The political implications are profound. Where social contract theories imagine individuals coming together to form societies, Yorùbá ontology understands society as constitutive of personhood itself. This leads to political philosophies emphasising consensus and reconciliation over adversarial competition, with clear implications for postcolonial African governance models.

Olúwolé ultimately presents complementary dualism as both a culturally specific Yorùbá ontology and a potential contribution to global philosophical discourse. Its relational approach offers resources for addressing contemporary philosophical problems about identity, ecology, and social organisation that individualist frameworks struggle to resolve satisfactorily.

Olúwolé concludes with a forward-looking vision for African philosophy that avoids both colonial dismissal and nativist romanticism. She advocates "serious comparative studies of human traditions of thought... carried out as dialogues rather than as speculative and ideological debates" (pg 177), creating space for African philosophy to contribute to global discourse while maintaining its distinctive character.

Central to this vision is reclaiming Africa's systematic thinking traditions: "the claim that Africans are religious people who are oblivious of the crucial role science and technology plays in the development of the human society, is not factually true of all ancient African societies" (pg 177). This counters both colonial stereotypes and misguided Afrocentric reactions that reject rationality as "Western," allowing African philosophy to engage modernity on its own terms.

Key to this development is engaging classical texts like Odù Ifá philosophically rather than only anthropologically or religiously. Olúwolé models this approach through her rigorous translations and analyses that reveal Yorùbá thought's logical structures (pg 98, 104-109). She demonstrates how these texts can inform contemporary philosophical problems while maintaining their cultural specificity.

Olúwolé proposes complementary dualism as particularly relevant for contemporary philosophical challenges: "Development based on the African world view of Binary Complementarity is what most scholars now see as the solution to the various forms of intellectual and social upheavals across the world" (pg 175). Its relational approach offers alternatives to the binaries and oppositions plaguing Western thought since Descartes.

She critiques African scholars who uncritically adopt Western philosophical frameworks or conversely retreat into anti-rational nativism. Both approaches, she argues, deny Africa's own philosophical heritage - the former by dismissing it, the latter by misrepresenting it as essentially non-rational. Her alternative is critical engagement with classical texts informed by but not subservient to global philosophical discourse.

The educational implications are significant. Olúwolé's work suggests incorporating classical African philosophy into curricula not as "ethnophilosophy" but as rigorous thought deserving of philosophical engagement. This would involve training scholars in both Western and African philosophical methods, creating genuinely comparative perspectives.

Olúwolé also addresses the political dimensions of philosophical development. By demonstrating African philosophy's systematic nature, she challenges the epistemic hierarchies that have marginalised African thought in global academia. This has concrete implications for knowledge production, research funding, and institutional recognition of African philosophical traditions.

Her vision extends beyond academia to broader social development. Complementary dualism's relational ontology, she suggests, could inform more humane approaches to governance, conflict resolution, and economic organisation in African contexts. This represents an alternative to both neoliberal individualism and authoritarian collectivism that have dominated postcolonial development discourse.

Ultimately, Olúwolé's project opens paths for African philosophy to contribute uniquely to universal human thought while maintaining its cultural distinctiveness. By demonstrating classical Yorùbá philosophy's sophistication through rigorous analysis rather than polemic, she provides a model for philosophical development that avoids both Eurocentrism and insular nativism.